HEAVY, HIGH SPEED, COMMUTER, SUBWAY
RAIL SYSTEM SAFETY
HCRQ offers extensive coverage in these areas.
We have experience in the development and end-to-end implementation of rail System Safety Program Plans.
We exist to prevent accidents such as the Washington Metro collision which occurred on June 22, 2009, and the Walt Disney World monorail collision which occurred on July 5, 2009.
There are "domain" experts and there are "system safety and software safety" experts. Our knowledge and experience in system safety and software safety easily exceeds that of:
- rail transportation system suppliers,
- rail transportation system regulators,
- rail transportation system consultants, and
- many others who call themselves rail system safety engineers.
Our experience spans:
- System Safety,
- Software Safety,
- QA/QC,
- Design,
- Installation,
- Test & Commissioning (T&C), and
- Operation and Maintenance (O&M).
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ONE of OUR RAIL SAFETY CONTRACTS (HIGH SPEED RAIL)
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49CFR PARTS 229 and 238
LOCOMOTIVE SAFETY STANDARDS |
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HCRQ performed a Risk Assessment on the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX) System.
The FOX was intended to connect Miami, Orlando and Tampa using TGV technology with a maximum train speed of 200 mph. We prepared and presented this risk assessment to FRA. What were the hazards unique to Florida?
We also provided consulting services on the System Safety Program and emergency preparedness portions of the Rules for Particular Applicability. 49CFR238.105
Some of our clients must comply with 49CFR238 Subpart B "Safety Planning and General Requirements" which includes 49CFR238.105.
49CFR238.105 - "Train Electronic Hardware and Software Safety" requires a hardware and software safety program including: hardware and software FMECA {hmm, stop, really think about this} and several other interesting requirements listed in paragraph (c). HCRQ has provided:
VOSSLOH KIEPE
We performed an O&SHA for a propulsion system for this company. Their client was CAF. CAF's client was Houston METRO. Our O&SHAs are a much better pedigree than most.
TWIN CITY FAN / CLARAGE
We are responsible for RAMS for the Ventilation Fan Assemblies for the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension (TYSSE). HCRQ is responsible for producing documents such as:
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This rule surfaced on April 9, 2012. It applies to systems such as directional control, graduated throttle or speed control, graduated locomotive independent brake application and release, train brake application and release, emergency air brake application and release, fuel shut-off and fire suppression, alerters, wheel slip/slide applications, audible and visual warnings, remote control locomotive systems, remote control transmitters, pacing systems, and speed control systems.
Together with Cattron Group International (CGI), HCRQ rigorously scrutinized the NPRM and submitted comments to the FRA much the same as it did for 49CFR236 Subpart I. Look for our name in the preamble. You will see it many times. Subpart E (Locomotive Electronics), including Appendix F (Recommended Practices for Design and Safety Analysis, which mimics 49CFR236 Subpart H), are particularly "interesting". POWELL ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
We were responsible for RAMS for the Traction Power Substations for the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension (TYSSE). On this system, voltages as high as 27.6 kV AC are involved. Equipment includes:
HCRQ was responsible for producing a plethora of RAMS documents including:
One of the hazards, unique to these types of systems is arc flash. Arc flash can result in flying objects (often molten metal), blast pressure (upwards of 2,000 lbs. /sq. ft.), sound blast (noise up to 140 dB), and heat (upwards of 35,000 F - approximately 4 times the surface temperature of our sun). HCRQ was also providing QA/QC support to Powell as well as other traction power substation equipment providers. OTHER CONTRACTS
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