POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL
"Positive Train Control (PTC) refers to technology that is capable of preventing train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, and casualties or injuries to roadway workers (e.g., maintenance-of-way workers, bridge workers, signal maintainers) operating within their limits of authority as a result of unauthorized incursion by a train. PTC is also capable of preventing train movements through a switch left in the wrong position. PTC systems vary widely in complexity and sophistication based on the level of automation and functionality they implement, the system architecture utilized, the wayside system upon which they are based (i.e., non-signaled, block signal, cab signal, etc.), and the degree of train control they are capable of assuming." - FRA.
HCRQ is proud of its PTC experience which includes our assistance to Lockheed Martin on the system safety of the IDOT Positive Train Control System.
We also monitored the progress of the RSAC PTC working group and 49CFR236 Subpart I. Ultimately, the FRA published the PTC Systems Final Rule on January 15, 2010. Look for our name in this rule - it appears 44 times.
On September 27, 2010, the FRA published the PTC Systems Final Rule Amendments.
Coincident with the new 49CFR236 Appendix F (Minimum Requirements of FRA Directed Independent Third-Party Assessment of PTC System Safety Verification and Validation). HCRQ offers this service.
For more information on PTC we refer you to the FRA PTC web page and the AAR PTC web page.
We can assist you with:
- PTCDP Section 4 (description of the manner in which the PTC architecture satisfies safety requirements)
- PTCDP Section 8 (description of target safety levels including requirements for system reliability, availability; description of backup methods of operation and critical assumptions associated with target levels)
- PTCSP Section 1 (hazard log)
- PTCSP Section 2 (safety assurance concepts)
- PTCSP Section 3 (risk assessment)
- PTCSP Section 4 (hazard mitigation analysis)
- PTCSP Section 5 (safety assessment & V&V processes)
- PTCSP Section 13 (safety analysis to determine whether, when the system is in operation, any risk remains of an unintended incursion into a roadway work zone due to human error; if the analysis reveals any such risk, the PTCDP and PTCSP shall describe how that risk will be mitigated)
- and other PTCDP and PTCSP sections relating to safety