HCRQ
System Safety, Software Safety Experts
Since 1986
"The Key To A Safer World"
salus populi suprema lex
Welcome To HCRQ
Free Monthly System/Software Safety Newsletter
Click here to see a sample.
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We help assure:
- Missiles don't hit friendly targets
- Passenger planes don't crash
- Trains don't collide or derail
- Medical devices don't kill you
- Nuclear reactors don't melt down
- You don't get sued
Ever wondered why there aren't MORE accidents and MORE lives lost?
Now you know.
HCRQ has over 19 years of experience in designing safety
into and assessing the safety of complex safety-related systems such as:
- missiles,
- submarines,
- air traffic systems,
- weapons control systems,
- fighter aircraft,
- nuclear reactor control and monitoring systems,
- medical devices,
- space station systems,
- light and heavy rail transportation systems.
International System Safety Conference '08
August 25-29, 2008, Vancouver, British Columbia
More information
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Environment & Safety Assurance Symposium - ESAS 08
September 30-October 2, 2008, Bristol, UK
More information
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We offer the following services:
- Safety Manager
- We can provide the system safety or software safety manager role, or assist your manager.
- We can administer System Safety Programs from end-to-end.
- Safety and Security Manager
- We can provide the consortium system safety and security role.
- (i.e., the project coordinator and
liaison between consortium and client for light rail systems)
- Safety Working Group/Safety Committee Chairperson
- We can lead your SSWG/SwSWG or safety committee.
- We can represent the safety aspect of your project in front of your client.
- Typically, our safety knowledge and experience will exceed that of your client and their consultants.
- Think about the implications of this!
- Safety Auditor
- We can audit products or processes - either your own or your suppliers'.
- For more information click here.
- Safety Analysts
- We can perform specific safety analyses for you.
- We can perform safety analyses concurrent with your system design.
- We can implement entire System Safety Programs.
- We can review your or your suppliers' safety analyses and other safety documents.
- We can analyze the safety of an existing design.
- Some safety-critical systems do not have existing safety analyses.
- For more information click here.
- RAM Analysts
- We are experienced in RAM Plans.
- We are experienced in reliability analysis (allocation, modeling, prediction).
- We are experienced in availability analysis and demonstrations.
- We are experienced in maintainability analysis.
- We are experienced in testability analysis.
- We are experienced in FMECA.
- Safety Consultation
- We can advise you.
- Help is available by phone.
- Help is also available in person.
- We can arrange to visit you.
- You can arrange to visit us.
- Safety Guideline Preparation
- We can write system safety guidelines for your staff to follow (e.g., how to
prepare an SSPP, PHL, PHA, FTA, FMECA, O&SHA, etc.).
- For more information click here.
- Safety SOW, CDRL & DID Preparation
- We can write system safety SOW sections and associated DIDs.
- We once wrote SOW text, CDRLs, and DIDs for a client of ours.
- This client later told us that the successful bidder
wanted to know who the author was.
- Why?
- They were so impressed that they wanted to hire us!
- We can sell you system safety DIDs.
- We can help you scrub down SOWs and DIDs.
- We are very good at this.
- Why?
- System safety touches many areas of the SOW.
- We understand system engineering.
- We understand project management.
- We understand configuration management.
- We understand software.
- We understand reliability.
- Forensic Safety Assessment
- HCRQ provides around the clock, around the world response to accidents and incidents -
professionally, quickly, efficiently and, of course, confidentially.
- For more information regarding this unique service, starting with our experience with the THERAC-25,
click here.
- Safety Training
- We offer a wide range of excellent courses.
- We have 16 years of experience in this area.
- We have repeat clients.
- We offer open courses, and on-site training (domestically and overseas).
- We offer customized courses.
- We offer webinars.
- For more information click here.
- Policies
Software Safety
Look no further! We are renowned experts!
We were some of the early pioneers.
{You can always identify a pioneer by the arrows in their back.}
We are sometimes reminded of the poem by Robert Frost - "The Road Not Taken"
"Two roads diverged in a wood, and I,
I took the one less traveled by,
and that has made all the difference".
For more information click here.
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We have seen it all - the good, the bad,
and the ugly and THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF THE LATTER TWO.
In terms of safety-related systems, the world is often not a pretty place. This is some of what we've seen:
- Overzealous safety consultants driving projects to their knees
Their primary goal was making money
- Fault tree analysis based on DFDs
but the DFDs were not maintained resulting in the FTAs not been representative of the design
- No Corporate Safety Policy
- $80,000,000 in law suits before they brought us on board
- Little, none or out-of-date design documentation.
How about design documents that don't match the code, and code
comments that don't match either of the other two?
- No safety analysis for existing systems where functionality must be added and a safety assessment performed of the changes
- System safety program for defense helicopter of questionable significance
- Horribly over budget on system safety with funds being spent faster than they could be burned
- Significant amounts of time being spent on aspects of questionable significance
- System safety analyses way behind schedule
- Too many projects for too few safety engineers with no time available to perform analyses other than cursory ones
- Preliminary Hazard Analysis at revision 9
- Safety analyses out of sync with the design
- Hazard logging way out of sync with design
- Hazard logs with no traceability
- Practices being followed which don't work
- No minutes of safety meetings
- A design using 4000 global variables
with a large percentage being safety-related
- Current software version 20. Previous software version 17.
You will never guess why
- No traceability or poor correlation between safety requirements and design
- Weapons control software with SRS not up-to-date, SDD almost non-existent,
coding complete
System was for a submarine
- Project management and system safety completely out of sync with each other
- No records of peer reviews
- No peer review checklists
- Safety-related software designer. One year previous - kindergarten teacher
- No involvement by system safety in the subcontractor selection process
- Requirements which state that "the delivered system must be as safe as or safer
than the system it is replacing"
yet there is no pertinent data from the existing system
and this is some of what we've heard:
- He is an excellent safety engineer
{but he is upable to identify hazards}
- Please call me at home
{from a corporate executive trying to jump ship following an accident}
- The patient did not have long to live anyhow
- Weapons systems are inherently unsafe
- Safety analyses are unnecessary
Our pilots are used to assuming risk
- That can't happen
- All hazards must be eliminated
- We don't need safety analyses to defend us in court should an accident occur
- When it is time to integrate our software, we receive the modules over our network.
We're not sure who they are coming from
- We're not allowed to ask for a System Safety Program Plan
- Our system is not safety-critical (air traffic management)
- We perform safety analyses to satisfy the regulations
We don't use them as a preventative measures
- I am a safety engineer; I have been hired to deflect our customer's safety
concerns
{hired by a defense contractor, their customer was the U.S. Navy}
- We test safety-related software differently than we do other software
For safety-related software, we unit test it
- I've never heard of quantitative fault trees. What is a minimal cut set?
{from a "system safety engineer"}
- A hazard log adds no value and is just something else to maintain
- Our system is safe
- The problem with the silent alarm strip is that you don't hear anything when you press it
- We mitigate hacking into our communications network by using CRCs
- Why should we continue to analyze system safety?
We have not had any other accidents
{stated by the manager of a nuclear power plant following the
analysis of a Loss Of Cooling Accident}
HCRQ speaks your language ( SSPP , SwSPP,
PHL ,
PHA , HAZOP ,
SSHA , SHA ,
O&SHA , FFT ,
FTA ,
SFTA ,
FHA ,
PSSA ,
SSA ,
CCA , ZSA, PRA, CMA,
FMEA , FMES ,
SFMEA , FMECA ,
SFMECA ,
SRHA, SDHA, SCHA,
HHA ,
HTDB, HRI,
HFE ,
MIL-STD-882 ,
SAE ARP4754,
SAE ARP4761 ,
SAE ARP5580, EN 50126, EN 50128, EN 50129, MOD 00-56, IEC 61508, IEEE 1483,
IEEE 1228,
49CFR236 Subpart H ,
49CFR238.105 , IEC 60880, STANAG 4404, IEC 15026, IEC 60601-1-4, ISO 14971,
RTCA DO-178B, RTCA DO-248A, RTCA DO-254, RTCA DO-278, SILs, DALs, Safety Case ).
Our courseware is exceptional.
Many of our attendees are repeat clients because they are
comfortable with us and view our courses as the very best.
They appreciate
their inherent practical insight and "how to" nature.
- Do you have a challenging contract?
- Do you have a challenging client?
- Do you need training in either system safety or software safety either in general or in specific areas?
- Have you under- or over-specified safety? Many of our clients were victims of either over-confidence or under-estimation.
- Are you pleased with your present safety consultants?
- Are you ready for your client's safety audit?
- Is your client armed to the teeth with consulting engineers ready to bombard you with seemingly never-ending safety critiques?
- Have you experienced a software-related, or worse still, software-caused accident?
- Are you having a difficult time, perhaps in conflict with your client, knowing when you are "done"?
Get HCRQ on your team!
- We will help protect you.
- We will help protect those that use your system.
- We can save you tens of thousands of dollars in your safety budget.
- We can protect you against multi-million dollar law suits.
- We can give you an additional edge over your competition within your bids!
Don't wait too long! One of our clients spent 3 times their safety budget before bringing us in.
Due to numerous requests, we are maintaining and updating our quizzes.
Industry is finding them useful in evaluating the expertise of system safety engineers.
SYSTEM SAFETY
QUIZ #1 - Identify the Hazards
- Nitroglycerin
- Collision
- Derailment
- Burns
- Electric Shock
- Software Range Check Fails
- CRC Fails To Detect Corruption
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SYSTEM SAFETY
QUIZ #2 - Identify the Failure Modes
- Relay Fails To Cut Propulsion
- Relay Catches Fire
- Relay Fails To Be Energized
- Relay Contacts Welded (Closed)
- Relay Submersed In Water
- Software Fails To Work Properly
- Software Fails To Apply Penalty Brake When Discrete Input Asserted
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SYSTEM SAFETY
QUIZ #3 - More Challenging Questions
- Just How Important is the Selection of the Programming Language?
- How Do You Analyze the Safety of Functional Changes to a System When No Safety
Analysis Exists?
- Should You Consider Software Sneak Analysis?
- I am a Safety Engineer. I Have Too Many Active Projects.
My Day Seems to Consist of Moving from One Meeting to the Next.
Additional Safety Engineers Are Not Available.
Budgets Are So Lean That it is Difficult Just to Order Books and Standards.
What Can I Do?
- The Target Probability of Catastrophic Failure of 10^-9 Originated From Avionics.
What is the Basis for
Using the Same Target in Rail Systems?
- Are Development Assurance Levels from SAE ARP4761 Equivalent to Safety Integrity Levels?
- When Preparing a Minimal Equipment List (MEL - Avionics) Do I Repeat My Safety
Analyses Considering Various Unavailable Equipment?
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SYSTEM SAFETY
QUIZ #4 - More Challenging Questions
- What Can You Do if Management Has Decreed That You Cannot Request SSPPs, PHAs,
Hazard Logs, etc. from Your Subcontractors?
- What Should You Do if You Are Designing a Communications System but No One Can
Tell You Whether or Not It Will Be Handling Safety-Critical Data?
- How Do You Identify a Good Fault Tree Versus a Bad One?
- Is the Purchase of IEC 1025 (Fault Tree Analysis) a Wise Investment?
- What Is the Commercial Replacement for MIL-STD-1629A?
- Are Software Control Categories from MIL-STD-882C Equivalent to
Software Integrity Levels?
- Are Software Control Categories Equivalent to Software Development Assurance Levels
From SAE ARP4761?
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SYSTEM SAFETY
QUIZ #5 - More Challenging Questions
- Is Hazard Analysis the Same as Safety Analysis?
- What Is Wrong with Default Compliance of MIL-STD-882C?
- From a System Safety Engineer's Perspective, What is Missing from SAE ARP4761?
- From a System Safety Engineer's Perspective, What is Wrong with 49CFR236 Subpart H?
- What are the Two Most Popular Programming Languages Used in Safety-Critical Systems Today?
- Under What Circumstances is Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA) Difficult to Conduct?
- How Do Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), and
HAZOP Studies Compare?
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SYSTEM SAFETY
QUIZ #6 - More Challenging Questions
- Compare the Approaches Used by MIL-STD-882, SAE ARP4761, and MOD 00-56.
- Comment on the Use of Microsoft Windows in Safety-Related Systems.
- Comment on the Use of C# in Safety-Related Systems.
- Power is Lost to a Functioning Safety-Related System. What
Safety Analyses Could Be Used to Analyze This?
- If a Safety-Related System Fails, Due to a Design Error, Resulting in Loss of Life,
Can the Design Engineer be Held Personally Liable?
- What is the Difference Between a Failure Condition (per SAE ARP4761) and a Hazard?
- Does the application of RTCA DO-178B Improve Safety?
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SYSTEM SAFETY
QUIZ #7 - More Challenging Questions
- Comment on the Use of Java in Safety-Related Systems.
- How Does an SMP Differ from an SSPP?
- What is the Difference Between a PHL and a PHA?
- When You Transition from Dual Redundancy to Triple is Safety Increased?
- What are the 3 Causes of CRCs Failing to Detect Corrupted Data?
- More pending
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While you are here, check out our web page of useful
reference material.
"I thank you for your hard work, and for the many ways HCRQ contributes to making our country safer."
Jo Ann Davis, Member of Congress