Rail System Safety
We are rail system safety consultants.
We offer extensive coverage in the areas of light rail, heavy rail, and high speed rail system safety and software safety.
We have experience in the development and end-to-end implementation of rail System Safety Program Plans.
We exist to prevent accidents such as the Washington Metro collision which occurred on June 22, 2009, and the Walt Disney World monorail collision which occurred on July 5, 2009.
There are "domain" experts and there are "system safety and software safety" experts. Our knowledge and experience in system safety and software safety easily exceeds that of:
- rail transportation system suppliers,
- rail transportation system regulators,
- rail transportation system consultants, and
- many others who call themselves rail system safety engineers.
Our experience spans:
- Design,
- Installation,
- Test & Commissioning (T&C), and
- Operation and Maintenance (O&M).
One Of Our Rail Safety Contracts
(High Speed Rail)
Perform a Risk Assessment of the Florida Overland eXpress System
The FOX was intended to connect Miami, Orlando and Tampa using TGV technology with a maximum train speed of 200 mph.
We prepared and presented this risk assessment to FRA.
What were the hazards unique to Florida?
- sink holes
- alligators
- panthers
- hurricanes
- high water table
We also provided consulting services on the System Safety Program and emergency preparedness portions of the Rules for Particular Applicability.
JFK AirTrain System Safety & Security Manager
It is an excellent idea to have a system safety & security manager on light rail projects. This person is the customer's single point of contact for all matters relating to safety & security. This person oversees and coordinates the safety & security aspects of design, construction, installation, T&C, and O&M and the interfaces between them. (many people have been either seriously injured or killed during construction and T&C)
In order to be effective, this person must be a very knowledgeable and experienced in rail transit system design. This person must also be granted the authority, by the rail transit consortium to influence these aspects. Customers should reject any safety & security manager who is not empowered to perform their job. In addition, this person needs to be mobile in order to oversee, interact and coordinate.
HCRQ is experienced in this role. We also have experience with customer safety and security committees. The safety committee can represent a challenge to the safety & security manager especially if the customer does not have at least one system safety engineer of their own.
On the JFK AirTrain project, we liaised with the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey and were responsible for the production of:
- safety certification program plan,
- safety certification report,
- system security program plan,
- security threat & vulnerability analysis,
- access control plan,
- wayside intrusion detection analysis, and
- security system design document.
- Positive Train Control (PTC)
- High Speed Rail
- Light Rail System Safety
- RSPPs
- 49CFR236 Subpart H
- 49CFR236 Subpart I
- 49CFR238.105
- Grade Crossing Hazard Analysis
- RCL Systems
- RAM
- Rail System Security
- Client Challenges {Interesting Reading}
- Rail Safety-Related Courses & Who Has Attended
- Track Safety
- Links to Rail-Related Web Sites
- Rail System Safety Reference Material
HCRQ has provided:
- system safety consulting services,
- software safety consulting services, and
- training
with respect to compliance
with this regulation.
In fact we were the first
to do so!
Subpart H requires a Railroad
Safety Program Plan (RSPP),
and a 20-section Product Safety Plan (PSP)
including:
- risk assessment, and
- safety assessment.
Some of the appendices of 49CFR236 underwent revision coincident with the creation of Subpart I. In addition, Appendix F was added.
Within Appendix B (risk assessment), one addition is "Software fault/failure analysis must be based on the assessment of the design and implementation of all safety-related software including the application code, its operating/ executive program, COTS software, and associated device drivers, as well as historical performance data, analytical methods and experimental safety-critical performance testing performed on the subsystem or component. The software assessment process must demonstrate through repeatable predictive results that all software defects have been identified and corrected by process with a high degree of confidence." Another is "The railroad shall document any assumptions regarding software defects. These assumptions shall be in a form that permit the railroad to project the likelihood of detecting an in-service software defect. These assumptions shall be documented in such a form as to permit later comparisons with in-service experience." Ask HCRQ for help in these areas.
We analyzed the modifications proposed by the RSAC PTC Working Group, from the standpoint of safety assessment and risk assessment, and identified a significant number of areas that would be subject to interpretation or would result in increased cost. We are used to performing roles such as this. We step up to the plate while other safety engineers sit in the stands.
As a result of a collaborative effort between HCRQ and Cattron Group International (CGI), we submitted comments to the FRA, and attended the last meeting of the RSAC PTC Working Group to defend them. Our comments, and the net results, are documented in the PTC System Final Rule.
Coincident with the new 49CFR236 Appendix F (Minimum Requirements of FRA Directed Independent Third-Party Assessment of PTC System Safety Verification and Validation). HCRQ offers this service.
By the way, did you know that we developed a system safety course based on 49CFR236 Subpart H!
The draft of this subpart was produced by FRA together with the other members of the RSAC PTC WG. Goodbye RSPP. Hello PTCIP (PTC Implementation Plan), PTCDP (PTC Development Plan), and PTCSP (PTC Safety Plan)!
We analyzed this new subpart from the standpoint of safety assessment and risk assessment.
The FRA published the PTC System Final Rule on January 15, 2010.
Coincident with the new 49CFR236 Appendix F (Minimum Requirements of FRA Directed Independent Third-Party Assessment of PTC System Safety Verification and Validation). HCRQ offers this service.
Check out Subpart H modifications (above) if you have not already done so.
A final note: if you are working with or considering other Subpart H or I safety consultants, ask them for their credentials as system safety engineers. We guarantee we are the real thing!
"Safety Planning and General Requirements" which includes 49CFR238.105.
49CFR238.105 - "Train Electronic Hardware and Software Safety"
requires a hardware and software safety program including:
hardware and software FMECA {hmm, stop, really think about this}
and several other interesting requirements listed in paragraph (c).
HCRQ has provided:
- system safety consulting services,
- software safety consulting services, and
- training (no wonder!)
with respect to compliance
with this regulation.
Again, we were the first to
do so!